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CANADIAN ARISTOTLE SOCIETY / LA SOCIÉTÉ ARISTOTÉLICIENNE DU CANADA

University of Ottawa / Université d'Ottawa, **November 8/9 Novembre, 2024**

**ARISTOTLE AND METAPHYSICS / ARISTOTE ET LA MÉTAPHYSIQUE**

**Thursday, Nov. 7 (Optional) / Jeudi 7 novembre (optionel) :**

1. **14h00-17h00** : Walk in Gatineau Park / Promenade dans le Parc de la Gatineau. We will meet at the University of Ottawa (8th floor of Desmarais) at **14h00**. Contact Ms. Laurence Lauzon for more information, [laurence.lauzon@gmail.com](mailto:laurence.lauzon@gmail.com). / Nous nous retrouverons à l'Université d'Ottawa (8e étage du pavillon Desmarais) à **14h00**. Contactez Mme Laurence Lauzon pour plus d'informations, [laurence.lauzon@gmail.com](mailto:laurence.lauzon@gmail.com).

2. **18h00-21h00** : Informal greet at D'Arcy Magee's, 18h-22h00. 44 Sparks Street, Ottawa, ON K1P 5A8 (613) 230-4433. Each person pays his/her drinks and food. / Accueil informel chez D'Arcy Magee, de 18h à 21h. 44, rue Sparks, Ottawa (Ontario) K1P 5A8 (613) 230-4433. Chacun paie ses boissons et sa nourriture.

**D'ARCY MAGEE'S : [HTTPS://MAPS.APP.GOO.GL/KTYGDD2TTYOJUNTP9](https://maps.app.goo.gl/KTYGDD2TTYOJUNTP9)**



ZOOM LINK / LIEN ZOOM

1. ZOOM LINK/LIEN ZOOM, DMS 12102: <https://uottawa-ca.zoom.us/j/98047985193>
2. ZOOM LINK/LIEN ZOOM, DMS 8161: <https://uottawa-ca.zoom.us/j/95340992411?pwd=6Bhxb63DXmbnFUl6rrKDAtJJVaqb7g.1>

**ROOMS / SALLES : DESMARAIS (DMS) 12102 AND/ET DMS 8161:**

<https://maps.app.goo.gl/m16yxq44mDes8EJF7>

**Friday / Vendredi : DMS 12102 [PYTHIAS]**

**ZOOM LINK/LIEN ZOOM, DMS 12102: <https://uottawa-ca.zoom.us/j/98047985193>**

Time/l'Heure	Participant and Title/Participant(e) et titre	
8h30-8h50	Accueil, mot de bienvenue / Welcome	
A. CHAIR	<b>John Thorp</b>	
9h00-9h35	<b>Thomas Slabon</b> (PhD), “Winnowing Wisdom: Aristotle’s Typological Definition of Wisdom”	
9h35-10h10	<b>William Wians</b> , “The Question of a Science of Being in <i>Metaphysics</i> Epsilon 1”	
10h10-10h40	<b>COFFEE BREAK/PAUSE CAFÉ</b>	
B. CHAIR	<b>Gregory L. Scott</b>	
10h40-11h15	<b>Paolo Biondi</b> , “Aristotle’s Road to a Metaphysics of Form as activity of Being”	
11h15-11h50	<b>Scott Rubarth</b> , “Light is Not Visible: Metaphysical Paradoxes and Problems in Aristotle’s Account of Light”	
11h50-12h25	<b>Gregory MacIsaac</b> , “Aristotle on the Complexity of the Elements against the Presocratic Materialists”	
12h25-14h00	<b>LUNCH/ DINER</b>	
C. CHAIR	<b>Gregory MacIsaac</b>	
14h00-14h35	<b>Laurence Lauzon</b> (PhD), “Can a Substance be Composed of Substances?”	
14h35-15h15	<b>Jordan Olver</b> , “The Multiplicity of Separate Substances”	
15h15-15h45	<b>COFFEE BREAK/PAUSE CAFÉ</b>	
D. CHAIR	<b>Joanne Waugh</b>	
15h45-16h20	<b>George Simons</b> (PhD), « L’Héraclite du livre Gamma »	
16h20-16h55	<b>Eusebius Nkwagu</b> (PhD), “Aristotle and Metaphysics”	
<p><b>KEYNOTE ADDRESS (DMS 12110), 17h30 p.m., followed by RECEPTION (DMS 12102) / “KEYNOTE” (DMS 12110), 17h30, suivi de RÉCEPTION (DMS 12102):</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Dr. Francisco Gonzalez</b> (University d’Ottawa): <i>Aristotle’s Distinction Between ‘Activity’ (Energeia) and ‘Motion’ (Kinêsis) in Metaphysics Θ6 and its Reception by Plotinus and Iamblichus</i></li> <li>• <b>ZOOM LINK/LIEN ZOOM, DMS 12102: <a href="https://uottawa-ca.zoom.us/j/98047985193">https://uottawa-ca.zoom.us/j/98047985193</a></b></li> </ul>		

**Friday / Vendredi : DMS 8161 [NICOMACHUS]**

**ZOOM LINK/LIEN ZOOM, DMS 8161: <https://uottawa-ca.zoom.us/j/95340992411?pwd=6Bhxb63DXmbnFUl6rrKDAtJJVaqb7g.1>**

8h30-8h50	Accueil, mot de bienvenue / Welcome	
A. CHAIR	<b>Christopher Lutz</b>	
9h00-9h35	<b>Peter Haskett</b> (PhD), “The Socratic Origins of Aristotle’s Formal Cause”	
9h35-10h10	<b>Angela Curran</b> , “Individual Forms in Aristotle’s <i>Metaphysics</i> VII and XII”	
10h10-10h40	<b>COFFEE BREAK/PAUSE CAFÉ</b>	
B. CHAIR	<b>Peter Haskett</b>	
10h40-11h15	<b>Jay Elliot</b> , “Aristotle on Necessity and the voluntary”	
11h15-11h50	No Session in this class / Pas de séance dans ce cours	
11h50-12h25	No Session in this class / Pas de séance dans ce cours	
12h25-14h00	<b>LUNCH/ DINER</b>	
C. CHAIR	<b>Emily Katz</b>	
14h00-14h35	<b>Joanne Waugh</b> , “A Metaphysics Worthy of the Name?”	
14h35-15h15	<b>Michael A. Schintgen</b> , “The Unintegrated Soul: The Ambiguous Place of the Soul in Aristotle’s <i>Metaphysics</i> ”	
15h15-15h45	<b>COFFEE BREAK/PAUSE CAFÉ</b>	
D. CHAIR	<b>Angela Curran</b>	
15h45-16h20	<b>Vazirova Mashhura Sultanovna</b> , “Metaphysics of Aristotle”	
16h20-16h55	<b>Rizoyev Firdavs Abduraxmon</b> , “Metaphysics in Aristotle’s Teaching”	
<p><b>KEYNOTE ADDRESS (DMS 12102), 17h30 p.m., followed by RECEPTION (DMS 12102) / “KEYNOTE” (DMS 12102), 17h30, suivi de RÉCEPTION (DMS 12102):</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Dr. Francisco Gonzalez (University d’Ottawa):</b> <i>Aristotle’s Distinction Between ‘Activity’ (Energeia) and ‘Motion’ (Kinêsis) in Metaphysics Θ6 and its Reception by Plotinus and Iamblichus</i></li> <li>• <b>ZOOM LINK/LIEN ZOOM, DMS 12102: <a href="https://uottawa-ca.zoom.us/j/98047985193">https://uottawa-ca.zoom.us/j/98047985193</a></b></li> </ul>		

**Saturday / Samedi : DMS 12102 [PYTHIAS]**

**ZOOM LINK/LIEN ZOOM, DMS 12102: <https://uottawa-ca.zoom.us/j/98047985193>**

<b>Time/l'Heure</b>	<b>Participant and Title/Participant(e) et titre</b>	
A. CHAIR	<b>William Wians</b>	
9h00-9h35	<b>Emily Katz</b> , “What Does a Mathematician’s Thinking Actualize?”	
9h35-10h10	<b>Antoine Pageau-St-Hilaire</b> (PhD), “Formal and Numerical Unity in Aristotle’s <i>Metaphysics</i> $\Delta$ 6”	
10h10-10h40	<b>COFFEE BREAK/PAUSE CAFÉ</b>	
B. CHAIR	<b>Thomas Slabon</b>	
10h40-11h15	<b>John Thorp</b> , “Different <i>Differentiae</i> ”	
11h15-11h50	<b>Benjamin Wilck</b> , “Definition by Addition Versus Definition by Division: How Does Aristotle Define Qualities and <i>Differentiae</i> ?”	
11h50-12h25	<b>Constança Barahona</b> , “Delimiting the Question of Definition in Aristotle’s <i>Metaphysics</i> with the Help of the Topics and its Dialectical Method”	
12h25-14h00	<b>LUNCH/ DINER</b>	
C. CHAIR	<b>Laurence Lauzon</b>	
14h00-14h35	<b>Christopher Lutz and Ronald Polansky</b> , “Does <i>Metaphysics</i> Lambda Disappoint?”	
14h35-15h15	<b>Gregory L. Scott</b> , “The Final Nails in the Coffin of Aristotle’s Unmoved Mover of Lambda”	
15h15-15h45	<b>COFFEE BREAK/PAUSE CAFÉ</b>	
D. CHAIR	<b>Jordan Olver</b>	
15h45-16h20	<b>Jean-Marc Narbonne</b> , « Les dieux sont-ils concernés par les affaires humaines ? Les exposés contrastés des chapitres 8 et 9 du Livre 10 de l’ <i>Éthique à Nicomaque</i> »	
16h20-16h55	<b>Mathieu Marion</b> , “Dialectic, Induction and the Search for First Principles”	
16h55-17h30	<b>Majid Amini</b> , “ <i>Aristotle and Metaphysical Logicism</i> ”	

- **18h30** (\$80/person) **BANQUET** (80\$/personne) – Trattoria Caffè Italia, <https://www.trattoriaitalia.com/>. **(Optional/Optionel)**

**Saturday / Samedi : DMS 8161 [NICOMACHUS]**

**ZOOM LINK/LIEN ZOOM, DMS 8161: <https://uottawa-ca.zoom.us/j/95340992411?pwd=6Bhxb63DXmbnFUl6rrKDatJJVaqb7g.1>**

Time/l'Heure	Participant and Title/Participant(e) et titre	
A. CHAIR	<b>Michael A. Schintgen</b>	
9h00-9h35	<b>Karim Ayad (MA)</b> , "A Divine paradigm: Thinking as the Primary Event-Space"	
9h35-10h10	<b>Thomas M. Olshewsky</b> , "From Mount Olympus to NOUS"	
10h10-10h40	<b>COFFEE BREAK/PAUSE CAFÉ</b>	
B. CHAIR	<b>Paolo Biondi</b>	
10h40-11h15	<b>Silvia Fazzo</b> , « Première philosophie comme science de l'être en tant qu'être dans la métaphysique d'Aristote »	<b>ZOOM</b>
11h15-11h50	<b>Laetitia Monteils-Laeng</b> , « Le moteur vient d'en haut, la matière vient d'en bas » ( <i>Météo.</i> , 2.4, 361a31-33) – météores et cataclysmes dans la cosmologie éternitaire d'Aristote »	<b>ZOOM</b>
11h50-12h25	<b>George Simons (PhD)</b> , « L'Héraclite du livre Gamma »	
12h25-14h00	<b>LUNCH/ DINER</b>	
C. CHAIR	<b>Antoine Pageau-St-Hilaire</b>	
14h00-14h35	<b>Vanessa Arviset</b> , « Mémoire et Métaphysique Delta »	
14h35-15h15	<b>Louise Rodrigue</b> , « Le statut des <i>Éthiques</i> aristotéliennes selon <i>Métaphysique</i> , E, 1 »	
15h15-15h45	<b>COFFEE BREAK/PAUSE CAFÉ</b>	
D. CHAIR	<b>Jay Elliot</b>	
15h45-16h20	<b>Etienne Rouleau (PhD)</b> , "The <i>skopos</i> of Theophrastus' <i>Metaphysics</i> : Setting the Stage to a Convincing (Aristotelian) Account of the Eternity of Movement"	
16h20-16h55	<b>Puthiran Jeyapalasingham (PhD)</b> , "First Philosophy and Ethics: The Necessity of <i>Sophia</i> for <i>Phronesis</i> "	
16h55-17h30	<b>Gary Beck (PhD)</b> , "Aristotle's Metaphysics of Virtue"	

- **18h30 (\$80/person) BANQUET (80\$/personne) – Trattoria Caffè Italia, <https://www.trattoriaitalia.com/>. (Optional/Optionelle)**

**Gratitude:** The Canadian Aristotle Society owes a great debt of gratitude to all those who made this conference possible. I would like to thank 1) the Department of Philosophy and Professor Mitia Rioux-Beaulne for their donation, and to the graduate students, especially Ms. Laurence Lauzon, for their collaboration; 2) the Department of Classics and Religion and Professor Dominique Côté for their donation; 3) La Société de Philosophie du Québec and *Philosophiques* for their generous donation; and 4) the anonymous donor. We would also like to thank Mr. Zacharie Cadieux for his generous help in organizing Rooms and the Reception.

**Remerciement :** La Société Aristotélicienne du Canada a une grande dette de gratitude envers toutes celles et ceux qui ont rendu possible cette conférence. Je tiens à remercier 1) le Département de philosophie et la professeure Mitia Rioux-Beaulne pour leur don, ainsi que les étudiants

diplômés, notamment Mme Laurence Lauzon, pour leur collaboration ; 2) le Département des lettres classiques et des religions et la professeure Dominique Côté pour leur don; 3) La Société de Philosophie du Québec et *Philosophiques* pour leur généreux don; et 4) la généreuse donation du donneur anonyme. Nous tenons également à remercier M. Zacharie Cadieux pour son aide généreuse dans l'organisation des chambres et de la réception.

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November 8/9 Novembre, 2024

ARISTOTLE AND METAPHYSICS / ARISTOTE ET LA MÉTAPHYSIQUE

ABSTRACTS / RÉSUMÉS

**Rizoyev Firdavs Abduraxmon (Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Tajikistan)**

*Metaphysics is Aristotle's teaching*

Metaphysics is Aristotle's teaching on the causes and principles of being and knowledge, on what true being in itself is. The treatise on metaphysics, consisting of 14 books, is the most important of Aristotle's works on theoretical philosophy. This exposition of "first philosophy" is not a single, complete work; it was not completed by Aristotle himself. The treatise on metaphysics is most likely a compilation, compiled after his death from various rough works, fragments, and notes related to the metaphysical section of his system. This compilation is rather poorly composed; the order of its 14 books is poorly systematized.

The very name "Metaphysics" is in no way connected with the essence of this section of Aristotle's philosophy. When compiling the collection of his works, the above-mentioned treatise was accidentally placed after Aristotle's works on natural science - and the word "Metaphysics" literally means simply "the treatise following the section on physics." However, this word, devoid of a specific philosophical meaning, later took root in scientific terminology, becoming a generally accepted designation of the most general foundations of a worldview, the main initial principles of the system of any thinker. Aristotle calls the transition from possibility to reality in Metaphysics emergence. Thus, form is reality, matter is possibility. Only when the possible becomes actual, that is, when infinite and formless matter receives certainty, takes form, matter becomes a concrete phenomenon, and only then can we know it.

**Majid Amini (Virginia State University)**

*Aristotle and Metaphysical Logicism*

Bertrand Russell credits Gottlob Frege with being the first in "logicising" mathematics, 'i.e. in reducing to logic the arithmetical notions which his predecessors had shown to be sufficient for mathematics.' (1919: *Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy*, London: Allen and Unwin, p. 7) It therefore seems an anachronism to speak of Aristotle and logicism in the same breath, let alone the fact that Aristotle was not a mathematician either in practice or profession by any stretch of imagination. The purpose of this paper is thus to argue otherwise by setting the project of logicism within the larger context of metaphysics, rather than merely mathematics, and to offer some grounds for the logicist credentials of Aristotle. The paper attempts to locate some logicist landmarks in the Aristotelian text by focusing on two works of Aristotle in particular: his *Prior Analytics* and *Metaphysics*.



**Vanessa Arviset (Le Centre de recherche du CHUM)**

*Mémoire et Métaphysique Delta*

L'objectif de cette présentation basée sur nos recherches doctorales (Arviset 2023) est d'offrir une interprétation des termes « ἔξις ἢ πάθος » qui apparaissent pour définir la mémoire dans le *De memoria et reminiscencia* à la lumière de *Métaphysique Delta* 6, 1015b34. Selon les commentateurs du *De memoria*, un enjeu fort épineux dans l'emploi inconsistant de ces termes dans ce traité est de savoir lequel d'ἔξις ou de πάθος peut être privilégié en considérant le problème de la nature de la mémoire. L'occurrence d'« ἔξις ἢ πάθος » dans le livre Delta de la *Métaphysique* permettrait de défendre l'idée qu'il s'agirait d'une seule expression qui aurait son sens propre. Ceci rendrait davantage possible le fait de délaissier l'idée qu'ἔξις et πάθος soient deux concepts distincts et les problèmes qu'une divergence conceptuelle pourrait engendrer pour une définition aristotélicienne de la mémoire.

**Karim Ayad (University of Lucerne)**

*A Divine Paradigm: Thinking as the Primary Event-Space*

Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, and especially Book Λ, presents to this day a source of wonder in the philosophical sense of that Aristotle himself intended. In late antiquity and middle ages the interpretations positioned Met. Λ as an inquiry into the nature and existence of God as Prime Mover. This has since informed how to read *Metaphysics*, which has mostly been neoplatonic in nature. However, a wholistic reading of the *Corpus Aristotelicum* shows that this is far from Aristotle's intention. Thus this paper offers a re-interpretation of three key textual moments in Aristotle's *Metaphysics* that is based on four arguments. The first two are concerned with understanding what Aristotle meant *Theologikē* and God. The other two will focus on introducing event-space and causal-collapse as reconceptualization tools for understanding Aristotle's metaphysics. The latter arguments aim at understanding the participatory model of existence that the whole of Aristotle's Universe exhibited; a unity within the multitude.

**Constança Barahona (Federal University of Rio de Janeiro)**

*Delimiting the Question of Definition in Aristotle's Metaphysics with the Help of the Topics and its Dialectical Method*

The formula that expresses what a substance is is called a definition. Definition is one of the four predicates presented in Aristotle's *Topics*. The *Topics* are the books that elaborate rules for the dialectical method. In the *Metaphysics*, we are faced with the challenge of characterizing the science proper to the study of essence. But there's the problem of the degree of the utility of the dialectical method for knowledge. In this brief presentation, I propose to discuss the status of dialectic in Aristotle for establishing definitions and how this method can help us understand substances in his *Metaphysics*. Integrating Aristotle's dialectical method from the *Topics*, we'll try to show how dialectical argumentation refines definitions. By Aristotle's dialectical insights we can elucidate the significance of definitions in understanding substances and advancing knowledge.

**Gary Beck (PhD, University of Ottawa)**

*Aristotle's Metaphysics of Virtue*

In contrast to the orientation characteristic of deontological and consequentialist ethical theories, it is often thought that the ultimate object of ethical evaluation within the framework of virtue ethics is the ethical subject, or agent, rather than particular actions or action-types. The evaluative priority of agents is frequently grounded in a metaphysical claim: virtuous actions are defined by way of virtuous states or dispositions. However, several scholars argue that Aristotle does not fit this picture. Iakovos Vasiliou suggests that if Aristotle were to subscribe to the metaphysical and evaluative priority of agents, his account of the nature of virtue and ethical development would be viciously circular. As such, he ascribes to Aristotle a qualified adherence to the definitional priority of actions. In this paper I argue that the nature of virtue cannot be properly understood within the metaphysical framework underlying this debate. Virtuous actions are *energeiai*; as such, there is a significant and frequently overlooked sense in which the virtuous agent is one with their action.

**Paolo Biondi (University of Sudbury)**

*Aristotle's Road to a Metaphysics of Form as Activity of Being*

The author argues that Aristotle's metaphysics, the science of being as being, is primarily concerned with substance understood as the activity of being. In other words, substance is fundamentally the principle of form (if the substance is a composite of principles, matter and form), and form constitutes the essential activity of the substance. The argument retraces several significant steps taken by Aristotle in his analysis of the principles of nature, motion, and change (*Physics* I-III). Three steps are considered: the initial one of matter in the state of deprivation of form, the second one of matter in motion towards form, and the final step of matter being in-formed. By interpreting the first two steps as part of the coming-into-being of a composite substance, the culminating step is the being of it; and this state of being in-formed is interpreted as a dynamic being in/as activity (*energeia* and *entelecheia*).

**Angela Curran (Texas Tech University)**

*Individual Forms in Aristotle's Metaphysics VII and XII*

In Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, there is a debate about whether he supports the existence of individual forms. Individual forms refer to the idea that each thing's form (*eidos*) is unique and not shared by any other thing. This view is compared to the species form view, which suggests that form is a universal concept that exists separately from particulars and is what members of the same species have in common. I argue that if individual forms are simply instances of a species form, such as Peleus and Hector, there is no real challenge to the species form view. On the other hand, if an individual form is distinct from the individual that embodies the species form, there is no textual or philosophical motivation for distinguishing individual forms from species forms in the text in question.

**Jay Elliott (Bard College)**

*Aristotle on Necessity and the Voluntary*

In his treatments of the voluntary, Aristotle says that certain actions are necessitated (*anagkaion*) or done under necessity (*hyper anagkēs*), and argues that they are not voluntary on this account.

We might suppose that in making this argument, Aristotle shared the concerns of modern philosophers, who oppose necessary actions to free actions, on the grounds that necessary actions are determined to occur whereas free actions are not. In this talk, I show how to better understand Aristotle's opposition between the necessary and the voluntary by looking to his lexicon entry for "necessity" (*anagkē*) in *Metaphysics* V.5. There Aristotle advances what I call a privative conception of necessity, according to which necessity always refers to the conspicuous absence of some possibility. For Aristotle, the logical role of necessity in relation to actions is to cancel the implicature that ordinarily runs from "P does A" to "P wants to do A." Saying that P does A "under necessity" thus allows the agent to do A with only a qualified desire. From this standpoint, actions done under necessity are those in which the agent lacks a certain possibility that we otherwise assume him to have: the possibility of acting according to his unqualified desire. Drawing on Aristotle's metaphysics of necessity in this way encourages us to reject a reading according to which Aristotle's necessitated actions are those that are determined to occur, and to see that Aristotle's aim is rather to reveal that these actions are only conditionally desirable.

**Silvia Fazzo (Università del Piemonte)**

***Première philosophie comme science de l'être en tant qu'être dans la métaphysique d'Aristote***  
Étant donné qu'Aristote n'a jamais su que ses principaux livres philosophiques étaient sur le point d'être rassemblés dans une seule « Métaphysique » (ἡ μετὰ τὰ φυσικὰ πραγματεία), notre contribution propose une comparaison entre différentes conceptions de la philosophie première (φιλοσοφία πρώτη) dans les propres œuvres d'Aristote : pour tous dont ont eu une énorme influence au cours de la tradition aristotélicienne. Nous partons de (i) la prétendue « science de l'être en tant qu'être » d'Aristote (ὄν ἢ ὄν, dans Métaphysiques IV.1 et VI.1) ; nous voyons alors une telle approche évoluer, d'abord vers (ii) une science de la substance/οὐσία (οὐσία comme nom déverbal d'être comme participe présent, de ὄν, οὔσα, ὄν.

**Peter Haskett (PhD, The Catholic University of America)**

***The Socratic Origins of Aristotle's Formal Cause***

Aristotelian science is a science of causes. According to Aristotle, a cause (αἰτία) is an origin or principle (ἀρχή) of a thing, and there are four causes broadly construed—the material, efficient, formal, and final. Throughout his scientific treatises, Aristotle investigates and employs these four causes as explanatory tools and he shows that these causes are said in many ways. He regularly distinguishes his account of these causes as authoritative. He, and nobody else, has discovered the explanatory "limits" of each cause—what each cause explains about the "entity" (οὐσία, τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι) of a thing and in what way the four causes are correlatives. That said, Aristotle acknowledges that his discovery about the causes did not happen in a void. He acknowledges that he is an inheritor of the four causes from the Pre-Socratic and Socratic philosophers, and Aristotle presents himself as having perfected his inheritance. The focus of this paper is a part of this philosophic patrimony—the formal cause. Aristotle singles out Socrates and Plato as the only two of his predecessors that took seriously the question of the formal cause. What this paper discusses, then, is the Socratic origins of Aristotle's formal cause and to what degree we might consider Aristotle's natural science to be a continuation of Socratic philosophy.

**Puthiran Jeyapalasingham (PhD, University of Ottawa)**

***First Philosophy and Ethics: The Necessity of Sophia for Phronesis***

In Aristotle's work, we can outline two types of knowledge: theoretical (*sophia*) and practical (*phronesis*). These have different objects of knowledge: *sophia* concerns universals, and *phronesis* concerns particulars. Despite this distinction, I will argue that there is a dependence between the two types of knowledge. I demonstrate this by outlining a potential problem with *phronesis*, namely, that it may lead to relativism. To refute this problem, I will consider an argument from *Metaphysics* Gamma, where Aristotle presents the Principle of Non-Contradiction (PNC), a universal principle. By applying this principle to *phronesis*, I will show that the role of universals in *phronesis* saves it from relativism. The role of universals in *phronesis* therefore suggests a connection between it and *sophia*, specifically that *sophia* is necessary for *phronesis*. This thereby shows the value of incorporating metaphysics in a study on ethics.

**Emily Katz (Michigan State University)**

***What Does a Mathematician's Thinking Actualize?***

Many scholars suppose that for Aristotle, mathematical thinking actualizes mathematical objects existing potentially in sensibles: fixing one's attention on point  $\Gamma$  in the drawn line AB actualizes  $\Gamma$  and lines  $A\Gamma$  and  $\Gamma B$ . Some of these scholars maintain that such acts actualize mathematical objects in the sensible world. But then mathematicians have an improbable power: their thinking affects the ontological status of things in the sensible world. Others endorse the initial supposition but maintain that mathematical objects are actualized only in the mind. But this is incompatible with Aristotle's *Metaphysics*  $\Theta$  prohibition against un-actualizable potentialities: if mathematical objects exist potentially in sensibles, it must be possible for them to exist actually in sensibles. I show that the initial supposition should be rejected. I argue that Aristotle's mathematical objects can exist actually in the sensible world, but thinking does not actualize them. Mathematical thinking only actualizes thought-objects, which are not mathematical objects.

**Laurence Lauzon (PhD, University of Ottawa)**

***Can a substance be composed of substances?***

This paper explores Aristotle's views on composition and substantial unity as articulated in the final chapters of Book Z. The main focus is to determine whether and under what conditions a substance can be composed of other substances. I challenge the common view that Aristotle straightforwardly denies this possibility in Z 13 and 16. I examine the kinds of relationships that can exist between substances and show that a distinction between actuality and potentiality is key for understanding the kind of unity that belongs to composite substances. I explore the broader implications of Aristotle's views on composition by discussing the example of chemical, biological, and ecological systems. I briefly consider the possibility that ecosystems might qualify as Aristotelian substances.

**Christopher Lutz and Ronald Polansky (Duquesne University)**

***Does Metaphysics Lambda Disappoint?***

Much controversy regarding Aristotle's *Metaphysics* concerns its very subject matter: general investigation of being qua being or special investigation of eternal being? Naturally, *Metaphysics*

Lambda is embroiled in this controversy. Some commentators find inadequate the connection it makes between eternal and sensible being; others reckon Lambda an independent treatise! Against such views, Stephen Menn contends that Lambda is the culmination of the *Metaphysics*. Yet, conceding that eternal being's causal connection to sensible being is "thin," Menn allows Lambda only a modest aim: "to find some path up from sensible things to intelligible archai." We agree that the *Metaphysics* culminates in Lambda, but we reject this modest aim. Supported especially by  $\Theta.6$ 's motion-activity distinction, we argue that Lambda's account of eternal being as cause of the being, becoming, and intelligibility of sensible being is "thick." Thus, we establish that the *Metaphysics* has a unified subject matter—without deflating its project.

**D. Gregory MacIsaac (Carleton University)**

***Aristotle on the Complexity of the Elements against the Presocratic Materialists***

Aristotle thinks that the Presocratic Materialists fail to give an adequate account of the generation of a natural substance. In *Metaphysics* VII (Z) 17, he argues that substantial form is what makes material parts into a single thing rather than a 'heap'. In *On Generation and Corruption*, he argues that, in addition, the material components need to have internal complexity. Against the Presocratic Materialists, he argues that those who make one of their elements the underlying material of all the others are involved in a contradiction. Anaximenes' Air, for example, would have to become a 'cold hot body' were it to transform into Fire through rarefaction. If elemental transformation is impossible for them, their position collapses into those who posit eternal elements, such as Empedocles. But because such elements lack qualitative complexity, they cannot change in any way and so cannot enter into the variety of relations with each other required to form homoeomerous bodies such as flesh, or complex substances such as an animal. Susceptible only of change of place, the most unity they can have is like that of a wall, where particles of earth and fire are different bricks. Moreover, even this amount of organisation is more than Empedocles can account for. Without an idea of substantial form, when Love brings the elements together all that results is a 'heap'.

**Mathieu Marion (Université du Québec à Montréal)**

***Dialectic, Induction and the Search for First Principles***

My aim in this paper is to criticize some claims by Terry Irwin in the first chapters of his *Aristotle's First Principles* (1988) on the role of dialectic in the search for first principles. No clear definition of 'dialectic' is presupposed by Irwin, my first step will be to provide one. I shall then go through the opening moves of *Top. A*: the definition of 'dialectical deduction', the recourse to 'endoxa' as premisses, and the claim that dialectic "has a path" to first principles of all disciplines (including metaphysics). I shall then show that Irwin's distinction between 'weak' and 'strong' dialectic, the latter supposedly being composed of beliefs of a more 'fundamental' nature, is artificial. Furthermore, in opposing 'induction' to dialectic as another way to first principles, Irwin missed the fact that 'induction' is already dialectical.

**Laetitia Monteils-Laeng (Université de Montréal)**

**« Le moteur vient d'en haut, la matière vient d'en bas » (Météo., 2.4, 361a31-33) – météores et cataclysmes dans la cosmologie éternitaire d'Aristote**

Au livre I des *Météo.*, Aristote doit concilier un ordre du monde soustrait au devenir avec le phénomène d'assèchement progressif des mers (352a17-28). Aristote postule un phénomène de permutation des mers et des terres, dû au cheminement capricieux des cours d'eau (351a19-23) dont la génération et la disparition relèvent des météores *kata phusin* et *ataktos* (338b20). La météorologie, ses conséquences hydrologiques et géologiques sont l'effet des translations célestes et du mouvement solaire le long de l'écliptique, ce qu'Aristote résume par la formule suivante : « le moteur vient d'en haut, la matière vient d'en bas » (361a31-33). Depuis cette répartition étiologique, nous tenterons de reconstituer l'influence différentielle des mouvements célestes sur la surface terrestre (temporalité géologique) et sur les vivants (temporalité biologique), entre lesquelles s'imbrique une troisième échelle de temps qu'on qualifiera d'ethnologique, dans la mesure où l'histoire des peuples dépend étroitement de l'évolution des territoires qu'ils habitent.

**Jean-Marc Narbonne (Université Laval)**

**« Les dieux sont-ils concernés par les affaires humaines ? Les exposés contrastés des chapitres 8 et 9 du Livre 10 de l'Éthique à Nicomaque »**

La question du rapport au divin dans la pensée aristotélicienne n'a pas fini de provoquer la controverse, deux modèles principaux d'analyse s'opposant, celui d'un Aristote plus ou moins partisan des croyances traditionnelles grecques, et celui d'un Aristote réformateur en matière de théologie et défenseur d'un dieu de type philosophique, comme le Livre Lambda de la *Métaphysique* en dresserait l'image. Cette dichotomie ou cette tension entre deux modèles théologiques apparaît également dans l'*Éthique à Nicomaque*, et ce à l'intérieur d'un même livre, le Livre X. Analysant ces passages, nous tenterons dans cette présentation de trouver sinon une solution au conflit interprétatif touchant la théologie, plus exactement la « théologique » aristotélicienne – la modification lexicale n'étant certainement pas ici insignifiante –, mais d'apporter tout au moins un éclairage sur le sens et les raisons de cette opposition chez le Stagirite.

**Eusebius Nkwagu (PhD, University of Vienna)**

***Aristotle and Metaphysics***

According to Aristotle, metaphysics, the “science of being qua being,” is the first philosophy because it studies the first cause which is the first principle of all things. The first principle is the most universal principle of reality. Like Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas also calls metaphysics *prima philosophia*, the first philosophy. The principles of metaphysics are the basis of all other fields of study. The other branches of philosophy, the second philosophy, study specific fields. They study the less universal principles. Hence, they presuppose the first principle because their principles depend on the validity of the first principle. This paper discusses Aristotle's concept of the first philosophy and the second philosophy, the relationship and the difference between metaphysics and ontology, his concepts of being, substance and essence, a brief historical development of the first principle from Thales to Aristotle and lastly the other branches of philosophy as auxiliaries to study metaphysics.

**Thomas M. Olszewsky (New College of Florida)**  
*From Mount Olympus to NOUS*

Contrary to much popular opinion, Aristotle may have been the most god-drunk of Hellenic philosophers. Inheriting the official Olympian pantheon that was already fading in the face of oncoming pluralization of Hellenistic culture, he looked to Anaxagoras' notion of NOUS for the ultimate divine reality. At first personalizing the heavenly bodies as visible gods, he conceived the divine reality of NOUS as a creator god. His hylomorphic conceptions of dynamis and entelecheia opened the way to conceiving human NOUS as the pinnacle of natural psyche and to envision a divine being beyond the visible gods. His hylomorphic conceptions of nature not only led him to the conception of active NOUS as human contemplation of pure forms, but to a conception of divine NOUS as pure activity without becoming. These developments initially separated the peripatetics from popular religious thought in the developments of Hellenistic culture, but they led the way to Neoplatonic conceptions of the divine as Being beyond becoming. Ironically, such developments not only put the Unmoved Mover beyond the scope of nature, but put the teloi of natural beings beyond the scope of having their principle of motion within themselves.

**Jordan Olver (Our Lady Seat of Wisdom)**  
*The Multiplicity of Separate Substances*

In *Metaphysics* XII, chapter 8, Aristotle asserts a multitude of separate substances on the grounds that there are many eternal, circular, celestial motions and a distinct unmoved mover is needed to account for each. If, however, each unmoved mover is of the nature described in the previous chapters, there will be multiple entities “whose very essence is actuality” and who each merit the name “God.” Aristotle perhaps does not understand his multiple separate substances in this way. Later Aristotelians certainly would not. They would maintain that there can be at most one entity “whose essence is actuality” and who properly merits the name “God.” This paper examines the arguments that two notable Aristotelians, Avicenna and Aquinas, offer for this position. It distinguishes their several arguments into kinds and attempts to determine which is most philosophically basic. The paper then brings this philosophical consideration to bear upon the interpretation of Aristotle.

**Antoine Pageau-St-Hilaire (PhD, Boston University)**  
*Formal and Numerical Unity in Aristotle's Metaphysics Δ6*

According to Aristotle, one is not a number but the principle of number (*Met.*, I.1.1052b24; cf. Δ.6.1016b18 and N.1.1088a7-8). This is so because number is a definite plurality of “ones” or unities (I.1.1053a30, cf. I.6.1056b23-24 and N.1.1088a5). What kind of unity is this? The question of unity and its multiple meanings is addressed in *Metaphysics* Δ6. Since Aristotle, when he discusses unity as a principle of number, distinguishes between formal (κατ' εἶδος) and numerical (κατ' ἀριθμόν, τῷ ποσῷ) unity (Δ.6.1016b10-12, 106b23-24, 1016b31 ff.; I.1.1052a31 ff., 1053a19-20), this paper aims at understanding these different kinds of unity and their relation by reinterpreting the passage found at Δ.6.1016b31-1017a2. Contending that this passage has been misread by most scholars who have considered it (Ross 1975, 1984; Apostle 1979; Kirwan 1993; Tricot 2003), I argue that the sense of formal unity meant in the context is *form as whole*. Formal unity *qua* whole is the presupposed sense of unity for there to be something like an arithmetic unity, that is, the kind unity which is the principle of number.

**Louise Rodrigue (Cégep de Saint-Jérôme)**

***Le statut des Éthiques aristotéliennes selon Métaphysique, E, 1***

À partir d'observations faites dans la littérature récente, il apparaît que la tendance de certains exégètes à séparer rigidement deux concepts traversant la pensée d'Aristote, soit la praxis et la theoria, gagnerait à être reconsidérée. Bien qu'à l'évidence ces deux termes se distinguent, ce serait plutôt dans l'optique d'une gradation que de façon exclusive, comme nous entendons le montrer. Mais un tel recadrage de la relation entre praxis et theoria semble avoir contre lui la division des sciences opérée par Aristote au livre E de la Métaphysique. Il s'agira donc d'expliquer en quoi ce n'est pas le cas, en insistant sur l'intersection des trois types de sciences, notamment à l'aide d'un traité médiéval. Cette lecture permettra de rendre compte de quelques remarques d'Aristote dans les Éthiques, qui ont vraisemblablement amené les interprètes à comprendre ces ouvrages comme relevant de la « science pratique », alors qu'ils sont en fait des méta-analyses rattachées à la perspective théorique.

**Etienne Rouleau (PhD, Université de Montréal)**

***The skopos of Theophrastus' Metaphysics: setting the stage to a convincing (Aristotelian) account of the eternity of movement***

A rapid glance at the *aporiai* on the prime mover Theophrastus raises in his *Metaphysics* may incite us to believe he was there criticizing Aristotle. Such indeed has been the common stance amongst commentators. However, a closer look at the relevant Aristotelian texts reveals how hard it may be to defend such a position, since they already provide solutions to those problems. The interpretation I shall then defend in this paper is that Theophrastus' objective is not in this *opusculum* to criticize, but rather to set the stage to a convincing description of the Aristotelian theory of the unmoved mover, polemically highlighting its advantages through its opposition with contemporary Academics. Showing that producing conviction (*pistis*) by dialectical means is his aim (*skopos*), with regard to the preferred explanation of natural movement, will thus serve to demonstrate the pedagogical nature of Theophrastus' *Metaphysics*, and help us in defining its historical significance.

**Scott Rubarth (Rollins College)**

***Light is not visible: Metaphysical paradoxes and problems in Aristotle's account of light.***

What is light? We tend to think of light either as a substance (consisting of photons), or a property (defined by luminosity). Aristotle famously described it as an activity or actuality of a property, the transparent, present in three of the four primal, sublunary elements. Light is not an object of sight, but a precondition; what we see are colors. This theory is seen as riddled with problems. Aristotle explicitly denies light motion, an ability travel through space in finite time, but also hints that it possesses ray-like qualities (what Richard Sorjabi calls “directionality”) required to explain shadows and reflections. The aim of this paper is to examine a recent attempt (Costello 2021) to defend Aristotle's theory of light and vision and discuss a few of the stubborn metaphysical concerns which emerge from Aristotle's very incomplete discussion.



**Michael A. Schintgen (Our Lady Seat of Wisdom College)**

***The Unintegrated Soul: The Ambiguous Place of the Soul in Aristotle's Metaphysics***

Aristotle argues in his *On the Soul* that the rational soul is separable from matter. He further states in his *Metaphysics* that “it belongs to the student of nature to study even soul in a certain sense, i.e. so much of it as is not independent of matter.” This suggests that the rational soul can not be adequately treated of in Natural Philosophy, but must be reconsidered in *Metaphysics*. However, Aristotle fails to do this and so fails to integrate the soul into his *Metaphysics*. This paper will examine relevant passages from the Aristotelian corpus where the rational soul as separable has repercussions for understanding the origin and destiny of the soul, knowledge, and the nature of happiness. Included will be a discussion of attempts by later philosophers to relate the study of the soul to Aristotle's *Metaphysics*.

**Gregory L Scott (Independent Scholar)**

***The Final Nails in the Coffin of Aristotle's Unmoved Mover of Lambda***

My Aristotle's “Not to Fear” Proof for the Necessary Eternality of the Universe (2019) argues that the Northern Greek from Stagira dropped the Unmoved Mover (“UM”), typically identified with the “God” of Lambda 7-10, in favor of a proof guaranteeing the *necessary* eternity of the universe, whether or not the outer spheres have souls (required for desiring the UM and contingently moving in the heavenly circle). Subsequently, I published eight “digital extensions,” which provide evidence that Aristotle evolved to the *aether qua* divine 5th element, a position that Sarah Broadie independently deemed stronger, even though she argued (in one of the digital extensions) that Aristotle kept both doctrines. The *aether*, however, moves eternally *in virtue of its own nature*, dispensing with the Stagirite's motivation for the UM. Today I provide new evidence based on Eudemus, *On the Cosmos* and the late assemblage of our “*Metaphysics*” to seal the coffin of Aristotle's youthful indiscretion, which he arguably sensibly buried himself.

**George Simons (PhD, Université de Montréal)**

***L'Héraclite du livre Gamma***

L'Héraclite du livre Gamma : Mon étude examine la façon qu'a choisie Aristote pour rapporter et répondre à Héraclite dans le livre Gamma. La constante des quatre mentions à Héraclite est qu'elles sont des références indirectes : Aristote utilise deux aspects de la pensée d'Héraclite pour décrire le profil intellectuel des adversaires qu'il cherche à réfuter afin de fonder la science recherchée.

**Thomas Slabon (PhD, Stanford University)**

***Winnowing Wisdom: Aristotle's Typological Definition of Wisdom***

Aristotle's *Metaphysics* provides a curious multi-part definition of wisdom (*sophia*), progressively *winnowing* the domain of candidates. In A.2, Aristotle defines wisdom comparatively, as the epistemic state that is most F, where F is a set of properties (accurate, universal, teachable, divine etc.) shared by other candidate epistemic states that might qualify as ‘wisdom.’ This initial relational account is then refined through the clarification of elements of A.2's account in B and E.1. I argue that this winnowing method matches Aristotle's typological approach in other works like the *Nicomachean Ethics* and *De Anima*: to define wisdom, we must first mark off wisdom from other candidates within the relevant domain of inquiry, and then clarify the elements involved

in this initial account. Connecting Aristotle's definition of wisdom to similar accounts in other works, and to his typological method more generally, will offer new insight into the structure of Aristotle's inquiry in the *Metaphysics*, and suggest an important connection between Aristotelian and Stoic approaches to definitional inquiry.

**Vazirova Mashhura Sultanovna (Candidate of Political Sciences of the Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Tajikistan, Head of the Cabinet of the Department of Philosophy)**

*Metaphysics of Aristotle*

Aristotle is called the creator of metaphysics. True, every philosophy contains metaphysics, since it raises the question of being as a whole, of the universal, of the first principle. Therefore, Thales' thesis is metaphysics, and Plato's teaching on ideas is also metaphysics. However, before Aristotle, metaphysics itself as a teaching on the universal was mixed with other knowledge - mathematical, astronomical, physical, etc. Aristotle was the first to separate metaphysics from knowledge of another kind, belonging to particular sciences, and builds it as a special science, as a system of knowledge. Therefore, Aristotle is the creator of metaphysics as a science, as a scientific system. In constructing metaphysics, Aristotle relies on the entire history of Greek philosophy that preceded him, the history of the search for the first principles and true being, but above all, he starts from Plato's teaching on the idea (*eidos*) as the general essence of a thing. A higher theoretical point of view on being and knowledge was not achieved after Aristotle. Therefore, it is not without reason that sometimes the presentation of the history of ancient philosophy, oriented exclusively towards its theoretical content, ends with Aristotle, despite the fact that Greek philosophy developed for 250 years before Aristotle, and existed for another 800 years after him.

**John Thorp (University of Western Ontario)**  
*Different Differentiae*

Aristotle seems to wobble, over the *Corpus* as a whole, as to whether a *differentia* should belong to the same genus as the *definiendum*, or whether it should not. An example of the first case would be 'flying' as the *differentia* of bird; a bird is a flying animal, and all flyers are animals. An example of the second would be 'white' as the *differentia* of 'dove'; a dove is a white pigeon, but *not* all white things are pigeons. Let's call *differentiae* of the first sort *homogeneric*: they belong to the same genus as that of the *definiendum*; by contrast *differentiae* of the second sort of are *heterogeneric*: they belong to a genus other than that of the *definiendum*. In the first case the *differentia* implies the genus; in the second it does not.

After setting forth the above distinction, this paper uses it to shed light on three troublesome texts:

- i) *Categories* 3b 5-7, where Aristotle claims that the definition of a *differentia* belongs also to the species and the individual; this just seems flatly false.
- ii) *Metaphysics* VIII 6, where Aristotle tries (unconvincingly) to secure the unity of an essence by observing that its parts -- genus and *differentia* -- are related as matter and form.
- iii) *Enneads* VI 2, where Plotinus argues that the nominalist ontological scheme of the *Categories* is incoherent, because a *differentia* would belong to two different categories: substance and quality.

**Joanne Waugh (University of South Florida)**

***A Metaphysics Worthy of the Name?***

'*Metaphysics*', it seems, was coined by a first century CE editor to denote some of Aristotle's writings, those the editor placed after the *Physics* in his edition. But what did Aristotle consider the subjects of these writings to be? Presumably, 'σοφία' and πρώτη φιλοσοφία (primary philosophy) are their subjects. Σοφία, he writes, is a science that looks at first principles and causes, a science desirable on its own account and for the sake of knowing, one that includes natural science and mathematics as parts because their underlying subjects are beings. Πρώτη φιλοσοφία is a science of immutable substance, the study of being *qua* being. The question to be pursued here is what purpose(s) Aristotle's long discussion of the earliest philosophers in *Metaphysics* I serves, i.e., whether it is a contribution to *sophia* or πρώτη φιλοσοφία and if so, how it accomplishes this end.

**William Wians (Merrimack College and Boston College)**

***The Question of a Science of Being in Metaphysics Epsilon 1***

In this paper, I intend to show how the first chapter of *Metaphysics* Book 6 (Epsilon) works to prove that there must be a science of being. Over the course of the chapter, Aristotle invokes familiar distinctions between productive, practical, and theoretical forms of knowledge, and between mathematics, physics, and first philosophy among the theoretical kinds. But the process is not a straightforward laying out of a classificatory scheme. Rather, the very existence of a science of being as such—of a First Philosophy—is precisely the question at stake in Epsilon 1. The status of first philosophy as a legitimate investigation is not assumed at the outset. That there must be a theoretical science of being is a conclusion reached only after examining other forms of knowledge and the boundaries that limit those investigations into the kinds of things. Because each of these other sciences is bound by its own proper sphere, none is found adequate to provide the knowledge being sought—a knowledge of being, but also (as *Metaph.* A2 puts it) a knowledge that is both of the divine and worthy of the divine. But I shall also argue that the chapter's conclusion leaves the precise nature of this science only partially indicated. In this way, E.1 poses the question of the full nature of the science of being. In doing so, Aristotle sets the stage for the *Metaphysics*'s further investigations, while giving rise to one of the most notorious cruxes in Aristotelian scholarship.

**Benjamin Wilck (The Hebrew University of Jerusalem)**

***Definition by Addition Versus Definition by Division: How Does Aristotle Define Qualities and Differentiae?***

As commentators have noted, Aristotle criticizes Plato's method of division for being dichotomous, privative, redundant, and arbitrary, and Aristotle complains that division cannot prove a definition. However, commentators have neglected Aristotle's most important criticism: Plato's method of division is ontologically undifferentiated. Plato takes all sorts of definable objects – i.e., those of which there are Platonic Forms – to be defined by division. Specifically, Plato defines kinds – i.e., universal substances such as human and number – and non-substantial attributes of such kinds – e.g., qualities (including differentiae), such as male and female, and even and odd – alike by division. Plato restricts definition to division because he fails to ontologically distinguish between substantial kinds and their non-substantial attributes, considering qualities as kinds. To define qualities, Aristotle (in *Metaph.* Z.4–5) introduces an alternative method of

definition: definition by addition. After describing definition by addition and comparing it to definition by division, I set out Aristotle's linguistic markers of these two methods, and examine how they are employed in scientific proofs.



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